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i 
QUESTION PRESENTED  
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)’s criminal 
prohibitions on the provision of “training,” “expert 
advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel” to 
government-designated “terrorist organizations” are 
unconstitutional as applied to pure speech that 
promotes only lawful, nonviolent activities. 
 
  
ii 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
 
The following parties were plaintiffs in the 
district court and appellees and cross-appellants in 
the court of appeals, and are respondents and cross-
petitioners in this Court:1 Humanitarian Law 
Project; Ralph Fertig; Ilankai Thamil Sangam; 
Tamils of Northern California; Tamil Welfare and 
Human Rights Committee; Federation of Tamil 
Sangams of North America; World Tamil 
Coordinating Committee; and Nagalingam 
Jeyalingam.  This brief refers to these parties as 
plaintiffs. 
 
The following parties were defendants in the 
district court and appellants and cross-appellees in 
the court of appeals, and are petitioners and cross-
respondents in this Court: the Attorney General of 
the United States, Eric Holder, Jr.; the United States 
Department of Justice; the United States Secretary 
of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton; and the United 
States Department of State.  This brief refers to 
these parties as defendants.  
                                                 
1  On November 2, 2009, this Court granted the parties’ motion to 
amend the briefing schedule.  This brief therefore addresses the questions 
presented in both the petition (08-1498) and conditional cross-petition 
(09-89) for writs of certiorari. 
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RULE 29.6 STATEMENT 
 
Humanitarian Law Project, Ilankai Thamil 
Sangam, Tamils of Northern California, Tamil 
Welfare and Human Rights Committee, Federation 
of Tamil Sangams of North America, and World 
Tamil Coordinating Committee have no parent 
corporations and there are no publicly held 
corporations holding any of their stock. 
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OPENING BRIEF FOR  
HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT ET AL. 
 
  OPINIONS BELOW 
 
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-
32a) is reported at 552 F.3d 916.  Earlier opinions of 
the court of appeals are reported at 393 F.3d 902, 
352 F.3d 382, and 205 F.3d 1130.  The opinion of the 
district court (Pet. App. 33a-76a) is reported at 380 
F. Supp. 2d 1134.  Earlier opinions of the district 
court are reported at 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 9 F. 
Supp. 2d 1205, and 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176.  
 
 JURISDICTION 
 
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1254(1).  The judgment of the court of appeals was 
entered on December 10, 2007.  A petition for 
rehearing was denied on January 5, 2009 (Pet. App. 
3a).  Justice Kennedy extended the time for filing a 
petition for certiorari to June 4, 2009, and 
defendants filed a petition that day.  Plaintiffs filed a 
conditional cross-petition for certiorari on July 6, 
2009.  The Court granted both petitions on 
September 30, 2009. 
  
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
 
The First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, in pertinent part:  “Congress 
shall make no law … abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble.”  The Fifth Amendment 
  
2 
provides, in pertinent part:  “No person shall … be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”  Relevant statutory provisions are 
reprinted at Pet. App. 77a-81a and in a Statutory 
Appendix to this brief.  App. 1a-4a. 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Plaintiffs – a retired judge, a medical doctor, a 
human rights organization, and several nonprofit 
groups – seek to engage in pure political speech 
promoting lawful, nonviolent activity.  Specifically, 
they would like to resume what they were doing 
before the statutory prohibitions at issue here were 
triggered: teaching and advocating the use of 
international law and other nonviolent means to 
reduce conflict, advance human rights, and promote 
peace.  Under defendants’ interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B, however, if plaintiffs communicate such 
ideas to, for, or with direction from an organization 
that the government has labeled terrorist, they risk 
prosecution under that statute, which makes it a 
crime, punishable by fifteen years in prison, to 
provide “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” 
“service,” or “personnel” to such groups.  The 
government has stated unequivocally that these 
provisions make it a crime for plaintiffs to submit an 
amicus brief in federal court, to petition Congress or 
the United Nations for legal reform, or even to speak 
to the media, for the benefit of a designated 
organization, as well as to teach such an 
organization human rights advocacy or English.  See 
infra, pp. 12-13, 27-28. 
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The statute at issue employs ill-defined or 
undefined terms to criminalize pure speech.  It 
proscribes speech by express reference to its content.  
It is triggered by the Secretary of State’s selective 
designation of “terrorist organizations,” based on 
criteria that are in part explicitly political. And as 
interpreted by the government, it imposes criminal 
liability on speech and association without any 
showing that the speaker intended to incite or 
promote terrorist activity in any way.  Indeed, on the 
government’s reading, the statute makes speech a 
crime even if the speaker succeeds in reducing resort 
to violence by encouraging peaceful resolution of 
conflict.  
 
It is undisputed that both of the organizations 
that plaintiffs seek to speak to, for, and in 
coordination with – the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) – engage in a wide range of lawful, 
nonviolent activity, and that plaintiffs seek to 
further only such activity.   
 
Thus, this case asks whether the statutory 
provisions are constitutional as applied to pure 
speech that promotes peaceable, nonviolent activity.  
In that light, it is essential not to be misled by the 
statutory language of “material support” for 
“terrorist organizations.”  That language and the 
image it conjures have no relevance to plaintiffs’ 
challenge.  Plaintiffs’ speech in favor of human rights 
and peace is not material support in any familiar 
sense of that term.  Nor does it promote terrorist 
activity; indeed, its purpose is to discourage violence.  
Accurate identification of the actual legal questions, 
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therefore, requires a focus on the particular 
provisions and specific speech at issue, rather than a 
general invocation of the misleading nomenclature of 
“material support” for a “terrorist organization.”  
 
Plaintiffs maintain that, as applied to their 
proposed speech, the challenged provisions are 
intolerably vague, discriminate on the basis of 
content, and penalize pure speech and association.  
The government has a compelling interest in 
combating terrorism, but as this Court has insisted, 
it must pursue that interest with respect for 
fundamental constitutional constraints.  See, e.g., 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).  This statute’s 
sweeping criminalization of human rights advocacy 
and other speech fails that test. 
 
STATEMENT 
 
A. The Statutory Scheme 
 
Sections 302 and 303 of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. 
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1189 and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, respectively, 
authorize the Secretary of State to designate “foreign 
terrorist organizations,” and make it a crime to 
provide certain statutorily defined “material support” 
for even the nonviolent and humanitarian activities 
of such groups.2  
                                                 
2  Congress amended the statute in the USA Patriot Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 805(a)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 377 (2001), 
and again in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6603(b), 118 Stat. 
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Congress has authorized the Secretary to 
designate as “terrorist” any group (1) that is foreign; 
(2) that “engages in terrorist activity,” defined to 
include virtually any unlawful actual or threatened 
use of a weapon against person or property; and (3) 
whose activities threaten “national security,” 
expansively defined as the “national defense, foreign 
relations, or economic interests of the United 
States.”3  The Secretary’s determination with respect 
to the third, expressly political “national security” 
criterion has been deemed a judicially unreviewable 
“political judgment[].” People’s Mojahedin Org. of 
Iran v. United States Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 
(D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1104-05 
(2000).  The Secretary is therefore free to designate 
as “terrorist” any foreign group that has used or 
threatened to use violence based on an unreviewable 
assessment of whether the group advances or 
impairs American foreign policy or economic 
interests.  The authority has been employed 
selectively; many groups that use violence, including 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA), have never been 
designated “terrorist.”  See Office of the Coordinator 
for Counterterrorism, Department of State, Foreign 
                                                                                                    
3638, 3762-64 (2004). 
3  8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (criteria for designation); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)-(VI) (defining “terrorist activity” to 
include, among other things, any unlawful use of, or threat to 
use, a weapon against person or property, unless for mere 
personal monetary gain); 8 U.S.C. § 1189(d)(2) (definition of 
“national security”). These statutes are reproduced in an 
Appendix to this brief.  App. 1a-4a.  
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Terrorist Organizations (Jul. 7, 2009), 
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
 
Once the Secretary designates a group, it 
becomes a crime to “knowingly provide[] material 
support or resources” to the group. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B(a).  Incorporating the definition set out in 18 
U.S.C. § 2339A(b), the statute defines “material 
support or resources” as:  
 
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, 
including currency or monetary instruments or 
financial securities, financial services, lodging, 
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, 
false documentation or identification, 
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, 
lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or 
more individuals who may be or include 
oneself), and transportation, except medicine or 
religious materials. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (emphasis added), 
incorporated by 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4).   
 
The government interprets this statute to 
permit punishment without any proof that an 
individual intended, knew, or even should have 
known that his speech would be used for any 
terrorist, violent, or illicit purpose.  It is enough that 
he knew that the group he spoke to or for the benefit 
of was designated or had engaged in terrorist 
activities.  It is no defense that his speech was 
designed, as plaintiffs’ speech is here, to discourage 
violence and to encourage lawful alternatives.  
 
  
7 
 When Congress enacted the material-support 
statute in 1996, it declared that any “contribution to” 
a foreign organization that engages in terrorist 
activity “facilitates that conduct.”  AEDPA, Pub. L. 
No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (April 
24, 1996), 18 U.S.C. § 2339B note (emphasis added).  
At the same time, however, the statute expressly 
permits unlimited donations of medicine and 
religious materials, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1), and 
provision of such other forms of support as the 
Secretary finds “may [not] be used to carry out 
terrorist activity.”  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j).   
 
 A key House Report in the legislative process 
states that the statute was not intended to reach 
protected speech and association. The Report 
recognizes that “[t]he First Amendment protects 
one’s right to associate with groups that are involved 
in both legal and illegal activities,” and insists that 
“[t]he basic protection of free association afforded 
individuals under the First Amendment remains in 
place” because the statute does not prohibit “one’s 
right to think, speak, or opine in concert with, or on 
behalf of, such an organization.”  H.R. Rep. No. 104-
383, at 43, 44 (1995).  Quoting the Report, the 
government argued below, after the 2001 and 2004 
amendments, that the Report still reflected 
Congress’s intent and even added: “Congress noted 
that the statutory ban ‘only affects one’s contribution 
of financial or material resources.’”4  Despite these 
intentions, however, Congress defined “material 
                                                 
4  First Cross-Appeal Br. for Appellants at 5-6 (CA9 filed 
Apr. 4, 2006) (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-383, at 44), quoted at 
Plaintiffs’ Br. in Opp. 4-5. 
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support” in ways that criminalize pure speech, as 
this case demonstrates.    
 
 In 2004, after the courts in this case had declared 
the prohibitions on “personnel,” “training,” and 
“expert advice or assistance” impermissibly vague, 
Congress added to the statute an express recognition 
that application or construction of the statute might 
infringe First Amendment interests, and specifically 
disclaimed any intent to do so: 
 
(i) Rule of construction. –  Nothing in this 
section shall be construed or applied so as 
to abridge the exercise of rights 
guaranteed under the First Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i) (emphasis added).  At the same 
time, however, Congress added a new, undefined 
prohibition on the provision of “service.”  And 
Congress added definitions for the previously 
invalidated provisions that continue to criminalize 
pure speech and association, discriminate on the 
basis of content, and leave their scope fundamentally 
ambiguous.  
 
 Four prohibitions in the current version of the 
statute are at issue here.  First, the statute prohibits 
the provision of “training,” which Congress defined 
as “instruction or teaching designed to impart a 
specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge.”  18 
U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2).   
 
 Second, the statute outlaws the provision of 
“expert advice or assistance,” which is defined as 
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“advice or assistance derived from scientific, 
technical or other specialized knowledge.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339A(b)(3).   
 
 Third, the statute prohibits the provision of 
“service” but leaves this term undefined.  18 U.S.C. § 
2339A(b)(1).  The government maintains that 
“service” broadly encompasses any “act done for the 
benefit of” a designated group.  Pet. 17.   
 
 Fourth, the statute bars the provision of 
“personnel,” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1), which includes 
any person, including oneself, who works under an 
organization’s “direction or control,” but excludes 
persons acting “entirely independently” of the group: 
 
No person may be prosecuted under this section 
in connection with the term ‘personnel’ unless 
that person has knowingly provided, attempted 
to provide, or conspired to provide a foreign 
terrorist organization with 1 or more 
individuals (who may be or include himself) to 
work under that terrorist organization's 
direction or control or to organize, manage, 
supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of 
that organization. Individuals who act entirely 
independently of the foreign terrorist 
organization to advance its goals or objectives 
shall not be considered to be working under the 
foreign terrorist organization’s direction and 
control. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h). 
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B.  Plaintiffs’ Intended Speech  
 
 Plaintiffs include the Humanitarian Law Project 
(HLP), a longstanding human rights organization 
with consultative status to the United Nations; 
Ralph Fertig, a retired United States administrative 
law judge who has served as the HLP’s President; 
Nagalingam Jeyalingam, an American physician; 
and several domestic nonprofit groups that focus on 
the interests of persons of Tamil descent.  Prior to 
AEDPA’s enactment, the HLP and Judge Fertig had 
been assisting the PKK by training them in how to 
bring human rights complaints to the United 
Nations, advocating on their behalf, and assisting 
them in peace negotiations.  Fertig Dec. ¶¶ 10-18, 24-
26, 30-32 (March 9, 1998); J.A. 113-23 (describing 
HLP conduct prior to designation of PKK).  They 
halted such activities once the Secretary, in 1997, 
designated the PKK a “foreign terrorist 
organization.”   
 
 As the district court found, the HLP and Judge 
Fertig seek to 
 
provide training in the use of humanitarian and 
international law for the peaceful resolution of 
disputes, engage in political advocacy on behalf 
of the Kurds living in Turkey, and teach the 
PKK how to petition for relief before 
representative bodies like the United Nations.   
 
Pet App. 35a; id. at 5a n.1.  As Judge Fertig 
explained, he and the HLP would like, among other 
things, to “offer [their] services to advocate on behalf 
of the rights of the Kurdish people and the PKK 
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before the United Nations and the United States 
Congress.” Fertig Dec. ¶ 16 (Mar. 9, 1998), J.A. 116; 
see also Fertig Dec. ¶ 19 (May 11, 2005), J.A. 98 
(same).  They filed this lawsuit to seek injunctive 
and declaratory relief that, inter alia, would allow 
them to do so without being prosecuted for providing 
“material support” to a designated group.   
 
 Dr. Jeyalingam and the Tamil organizations 
similarly seek to speak in support of the 
humanitarian and political activities of the LTTE, 
which the Secretary of State, in 1997, also 
designated a “foreign terrorist organization.”  As the 
district court found, the Tamil plaintiffs 
 
seek to provide training in the presentation of 
claims to mediators and international bodies for 
tsunami-related aid, offer legal expertise in 
negotiating peace agreements between the 
LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, and 
engage in political advocacy on behalf of Tamils 
living in Sri Lanka.  
 
 Pet. App. 35a-36a; id. at 5a n.1.5   
 
 In this case, as resolved on summary judgment, 
the following facts are undisputed: (1) both the PKK 
and LTTE engage in a broad range of lawful 
                                                 
5  As the petition notes, the LTTE was recently defeated 
militarily in Sri Lanka.  Pet. 5 n.1.  Much of the support the 
Tamil organizations and Dr. Jeyalingam sought to provide is 
now moot.  However, the LTTE continues to exist as a political 
organization outside Sri Lanka advocating for the rights of 
Tamils, and plaintiffs continue to seek to support its lawful, 
nonviolent activities through the speech identified by the 
district court.  
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activities, including the provision of social services, 
political advocacy, and economic development, Pet. 
App. 34a-36a; (2) the PKK is the principal political 
organization representing the Kurds in Turkey, an 
ethnic minority subjected to substantial 
discrimination and human rights violations, id. at 
34a-35a; (3) the LTTE is the principal political 
organization representing the Tamils in Sri Lanka, 
another ethnic minority that has been subjected to 
human rights abuse and discrimination, id. at 35a; 
and (4) plaintiffs intend to speak only in furtherance 
of lawful and nonviolent activities of these groups. 
Id. at 34a-36a (describing intended support).6  
 
 The government has made clear that it considers 
plaintiffs’ intended activities criminally proscribed 
by the challenged statutory terms.  At oral argument 
before the court of appeals, counsel for the 
government maintained that if plaintiffs filed an 
amicus brief for the LTTE in this lawsuit, advocated 
on the group’s behalf before the United Nations, 
asked Congress to grant the LTTE an exemption 
from the statute, or provided advice on how to 
mediate disputes, they would be engaged in criminal 
activity under the statute.7  
                                                 
6  The government in its petition asserted that both the 
LTTE and the PKK engaged in terrorist activities, but plaintiffs 
both disputed the government’s evidence and argued that these 
facts were immaterial.  Pl. Statement of Genuine Issues in 
Response to Def. Mot. for Summ. Jdgmt. (July 18, 2005).  
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals made any 
finding regarding terrorist activities of either group.   
7  The tape of the oral argument is available at: 
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=00
00004505. The remarks quoted above occur at 33:15, 34:30, 
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 For example, the court asked government 
counsel:  “If you have an attorney in the U.S. who 
wishes to counsel one of these organizations on how 
to argue their case, or how to bring their case, before 
the United Nations, is that a crime?”  Counsel for the 
government replied: “Yes, your honor. We do not 
want U.S. persons to be assisting terrorist 
organizations in making presentations to the U.N., to 
television, to a newspaper, we do not want U.S. 
persons assisting these organizations except as 
Congress specifically has provided.”8  
 
C.   The Decisions Below 
 
 Plaintiffs filed this action in 1998, challenging 
the statute on First and Fifth Amendment grounds. 
They asserted, among other things, that the statute’s 
prohibitions on providing “training” and “personnel” 
were unconstitutionally vague.  (Neither term was 
defined in the original 1996 statute.)  The district 
court granted plaintiffs a preliminary and then a 
permanent injunction barring enforcement of those 
two provisions against plaintiffs’ proposed activities, 
finding them unconstitutionally vague.  See Pet. App. 
6a-7a.  It rejected plaintiffs’ other challenges, 
including their contention that the statute infringed 
their right of association.  Id.  The court of appeals 
unanimously affirmed the preliminary injunction in 
                                                                                                    
36:00, and 41:02.  
8  Id. at 39:20. 
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2000 and the permanent injunction in 2003.  Id. at 
7a, 8a.9 
 
 Meanwhile, Congress amended the statute in 
2001 to add another undefined prohibition on speech, 
barring the provision of “expert advice or assistance.” 
Plaintiffs filed a second challenge, and in March 
2004, the district court held that this provision, too, 
is unconstitutionally vague.  See id. at 8a. 
 
 In September 2004, in the first case, the court of 
appeals granted rehearing en banc (on requests from 
both parties).  Id. at 9a.  While en banc review was 
pending, Congress in 2004 amended the statute 
again, providing definitions for “training,” 
“personnel,” and “expert advice or assistance,” and 
adding a new, and undefined, prohibition on the 
provision of “service.”  Id. at 9a-10a.  The en banc 
court of appeals remanded for consideration of the 
effect of those statutory amendments.  Id. at 11a.  
 
 On remand, the district court held that 
Congress’s new definition of “personnel” cured the 
vagueness of that provision, but that the new 
definition of “training” and part of the new definition 
of “expert advice or assistance” (concerning 
“specialized knowledge”) were unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to plaintiffs’ proposed speech.  Id. at 
62a-66a, 68a-69a.  It also held that the new 
prohibition on “service” was unconstitutionally vague 
                                                 
9  Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno (HLP I), 205 F.3d 1130, 
1137-38 (9th Cir. 2000); Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and 
remanded in light of intervening legislation, 393 F.3d 902 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (en banc).   
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as applied to plaintiffs’ speech.  Id. at 66a-68a.  The 
district court rejected plaintiffs’ remaining 
contentions.  Id. at 46a-60a, 69a-74a. 
 
 Both parties appealed, and the court of appeals 
once again unanimously affirmed.  It reasoned that 
the constitutional “requirement for clarity is 
enhanced” where, as here, a criminal statute touches 
on “sensitive areas of basic First Amendment 
freedoms.”  Id. at 20a (internal quotations omitted).  
It emphasized that it was addressing the provisions’ 
vagueness only as applied to plaintiffs’ intended 
speech.  Id. at 2a, 22a n.6, 5a n.1 (describing 
plaintiffs’ proposed speech).   
 
 With respect to “training,” the court found it 
“highly unlikely that a person of ordinary 
intelligence would know whether, when teaching 
someone to petition international bodies for tsunami-
related aid, one is imparting a ‘specific skill’ or 
‘general knowledge.’”  Id. at 21a-22a.  Stressing that 
the term as defined “could still be read to encompass 
speech and advocacy protected by the First 
Amendment,” id. at 22a, the court held that  
 
the term “training” remains impermissibly 
vague because it “implicates, and potentially 
chills, Plaintiffs’ protected expressive activities 
and imposes criminal sanctions of up to fifteen 
years imprisonment without sufficiently 
defining the prohibited conduct for ordinary 
people to understand.” 
 
Id. at 22a-23a (quoting id. at 64a).   
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 The court noted that the prohibition on “expert 
advice or assistance” similarly encompasses 
protected speech or advocacy.  Id. at 24a.  It held 
that the prohibition on advice or assistance “derived 
from … other specialized knowledge” was 
impermissibly vague, id. at 23a-24a, but it upheld 
the prohibition on advice or assistance “derived from 
scientific [or] technical … knowledge.”  Id. at 24a.  
The court offered no reasoning for upholding this 
aspect of the statute, and merely cited school reading 
lists that identified “technical” as a fifth-grade 
vocabulary word and “scientific method” as a third-
grade vocabulary word.  Id.   
 
 The court also deemed vague, as applied, the 
prohibition on “service,” which Congress left 
undefined, but which defendants have stated applies 
to anything done “for the benefit of” a designated 
group.  Id. at 25a (adopting district court’s holding 
and reasoning at id. at 66a-68a).   
 
     The court of appeals agreed with the district 
court that the amended definition of “personnel” 
cured that term’s prior vagueness. Id. at 26a-27a. 
The court rejected plaintiffs’ other claims, including 
the contention that the statute imposed guilt by 
association in violation of the First and Fifth 
Amendments, and that the statute should be 
narrowly construed to apply only to speech intended 
to further an organization’s illegal activities.  Id. at 
13a-19a; id. at 27a-32a.10  
                                                 
10  Plaintiffs initially sought to provide a broader range of 
humanitarian assistance to the PKK and the LTTE, but 
plaintiffs at this stage pursue only their challenge to the 
provisions as applied to speech promoting lawful, nonviolent 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
This case presents a narrow, but critically 
important, question: does Section 2339B comport 
with the Constitution insofar as it criminalizes pure 
speech promoting lawful, nonviolent activities – here, 
core political speech, including human rights 
advocacy and peacemaking?  Plaintiffs argue that as 
applied to such speech, the statutory prohibitions on 
providing “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” 
“service,” and “personnel” are unconstitutional 
because they are vague, penalize protected speech 
and association, and impermissibly discriminate on 
the basis of content.   
 
The narrow focus of plaintiffs’ claims in this 
Court means that the case does not involve the 
propriety of banning financial or other tangible 
support to terrorist organizations.  Nor does it 
involve speech advocating or teaching criminal or 
violent activity.  Plaintiffs here seek only to 
safeguard their right to promote lawful, nonviolent 
activities through pure speech. 
 
I.  The fact that plaintiffs seek to engage in pure 
speech, of a political character, advocating only 
lawful, nonviolent activities, colors all of the 
constitutional analysis here.  The right to engage in 
peaceable political speech is at the very core of the 
First Amendment, and government attempts to 
                                                                                                    
activities, as described by the district court and court of 
appeals.  Pet. App. 5a n.1; id. at 35a-36a.  Plaintiffs read the 
injunction affirmed by the court of appeals as limited to 
protecting only that speech. 
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criminalize such speech warrant the Court’s most 
skeptical scrutiny.   
 
II.  The challenged provisions are unconstitution-
ally vague.  Criminal prohibitions affecting speech 
demand “precision of regulation.”  NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).  These provisions are the 
antithesis of precise.  The prohibition on “training,” 
for example, requires plaintiffs to distinguish 
between “specific skills” and “general knowledge,” 
“classic terms of degree” strikingly similar to those 
this Court has previously declared unconstitutionally 
vague.  Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 
1030, 1048-49 (1991).  To decide whether their 
speech is proscribed as “expert advice,” they must 
discern whether it is “derived from” general 
knowledge or instead from “scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge” – a distinction likewise 
far too uncertain and context-dependent to support 
criminal sanctions. 
 
To decide whether an appeal to Congress or the 
United Nations is a prohibited “service,” plaintiffs 
must distinguish between speaking “on behalf of an 
organization,” which the government claims is 
permissible, and speaking “for the benefit of” the 
organization, which the government contends is a 
crime.  And to avoid punishment for the provision of 
“personnel,” plaintiffs must guess what level of 
coordination or association with a designated group 
denies them protection for “entirely independent” 
activity and triggers the prohibition on acting at an 
organization’s “direction.”   
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Each of these inquiries, moreover, is further 
complicated by the fact that the provisions overlap in 
internally contradictory ways.  The “training” and 
“expert advice” definitions appear to permit teaching 
or advice based solely on “general knowledge,” but 
such teaching or advice would violate the “service” 
prohibition if done for the group’s benefit.  The 
“personnel” prohibition carves out “entirely 
independent” activities, but neither teaching nor 
advice could be “entirely independent” by their 
nature. Even independent activities would be a 
prohibited “service” if done for the organization’s 
benefit.  Muddying the waters still further, the 
government claims that there is an unwritten 
exemption for “independent advocacy” that applies 
across the whole statute, but would not allow “any 
collaboration or other relationship between the giver 
and the recipient.”  Pet. 22. 
 
The courts below correctly deemed the 
prohibitions on “training,” “service,” and “expert 
advice or assistance” “derived from specialized 
knowledge” impermissibly vague as applied, because 
they fail to afford plaintiffs any clear guidance as to 
what speech is criminally prohibited.  The same 
conclusion, however, also holds for the prohibitions 
on “personnel” and “expert advice or assistance” 
“derived from scientific [or] technical … knowledge.”  
All four provisions are therefore impermissibly vague 
as applied to plaintiffs’ speech.  Indeed, the 
provisions are so vague that they render the statute 
facially overbroad, for they appear to penalize not 
just plaintiffs’ speech, but virtually all speech 
promoting lawful activity when communicated to, 
for, or at the direction of a designated group.   
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III.  Wholly apart from their vagueness, the 
challenged provisions are unconstitutional as applied 
because they flatly prohibit pure speech promoting 
lawful, nonviolent ends, and because they 
discriminate on the basis of content.  The statute’s 
terms draw facially content-based distinctions 
between “specific skills” and “general knowledge”; 
between “scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge,” and all other knowledge; between 
“religious” and nonreligious materials.  As the 
government defines “service,” that term 
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.  It prohibits 
speech “for the benefit of” a designated group, but 
permits speech critical of the group.  And the 
statute’s penalties expressly turn on whether speech 
is associated with a favored or disfavored political 
organization.  The identical speech on human rights 
is permissible if communicated to, for the benefit of, 
or at the direction of, the PLO, which has never been 
designated, but proscribed if made to, for, or at the 
direction of the PKK.  
 
 The challenged provisions cannot survive strict 
scrutiny.  Prohibitions of pure speech are 
presumptively invalid.  And “[i]t is rare that a 
regulation restricting speech because of its content 
will ever be permissible.”  United States v. Playboy 
Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000).  
While national security is a compelling interest, the 
government has not shown that it is necessary to 
prohibit speech promoting peaceable, nonviolent 
activity to serve that end.  Indeed, this Court has 
repeatedly ruled that otherwise lawful expression 
and association may not be criminalized in order to 
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forestall others from engaging in illegal conduct.  
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); De Jonge v. 
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).   
 
IV.  The challenged provisions also violate 
plaintiffs’ right of association.  All four provisions do 
so, as noted above, by penalizing speech only when it 
is communicated to, for the benefit of, or at the 
direction of selectively disfavored organizations.  And 
the “service” and “personnel” provisions directly 
penalize association wholly apart from their 
discriminatory application.  Virtually any action one 
might take in conjunction with a designated 
organization could be viewed as done for its “benefit,” 
and therefore a prohibited “service.”  And if, as the 
government maintains, acting in collaboration with a 
group forfeits any protection for “independent 
advocacy,” the statute directly penalizes association.  
Congress may not criminally punish association, 
however, absent proof of specific intent to further an 
organization’s illegal ends.  As interpreted by the 
government, the statute contains no such 
requirement, and is therefore invalid.   
 
V. The provisions cannot be upheld under the 
intermediate scrutiny standard established in United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).  O’Brien 
applies only to content-neutral regulations of 
expressive conduct.  It is categorically inapplicable to 
statutes that penalize pure speech or association, or 
discriminate based on content.  In any event, the 
provisions would not survive intermediate scrutiny, 
as they prohibit vastly more speech than is necessary 
to serve any legitimate interest in national security.  
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VI. Finally, the Court can avoid all of the 
foregoing constitutional questions by interpreting the 
statute to require proof of intent to further an 
organization’s illegal ends where, as here, pure 
speech and association are at stake.  Congress 
specified that the statute should not be “construed or 
applied” to violate the First Amendment.  
Interpreting the statute to require specific intent 
where it is applied to pure speech and association 
would fully support, on statutory grounds, the 
injunctive and declaratory relief plaintiffs seek, and 
thereby permit the Court to avoid the constitutional 
questions raised here.   
 
This is the same route the Court followed in 
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), when it 
faced another statute that on its face appeared to 
impose wide-ranging penalties on speech and 
association because of the illegal ends of a “terrorist 
organization.”  The government’s alternative 
construction, which would exempt only “independent 
advocacy,” would not avoid the constitutional 
questions presented here.  The First Amendment 
protects more than the abstract right to speak 
“independently,” but also the right, asserted here, to 
speak to others, in association with others, and at 
the direction of others.    
 
This Court has warned that even “a state of war 
is not a blank check for the President when it comes 
to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.” Hamdi, 542 
U.S. at 536 (plurality).  This principle applies to 
Congress, too, and has particular importance for the 
statute at issue here, which is not limited to times of 
emergency or war, or to groups that have attacked 
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the United States or Americans.  Where, as here, 
Congress has expressly directed that its law is not to 
be applied in ways that violate the First 
Amendment, where no financial or tangible support 
is at issue, and where the government has not shown 
that criminalizing purely peaceable expression is 
necessary to the nation’s security, plaintiffs’ 
proposed speech must be protected.   
 
ARGUMENT 
 
I.  PLAINTIFFS’ INTENDED ACTIVITIES ARE 
PURE POLITICAL SPEECH ENTITLED TO 
THE HIGHEST FIRST AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION  
 
 Plaintiffs propose to engage in pure speech 
addressing political issues, which this Court has long 
held is entitled to the First Amendment’s highest 
protection.  The political character of plaintiffs’ 
speech is clear: they seek to lobby Congress, to teach 
and advise on human rights, to promote the peaceful 
resolution of political disputes, and to advocate for 
the human rights of minority populations 
represented by the designated organizations.  Pet. 
App. 5a n.1; Fertig Declarations, J.A. 91-126.  
Congress’s criminalization of such speech as applied 
here warrants application of the First Amendment’s 
most stringent safeguards.   
 
 “[L]awful political speech [is] at the core of what 
the First Amendment is designed to protect.” 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003).  “Core 
political speech occupies the highest, most protected 
position” constitutionally accorded to speech.  RAV v. 
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City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, 
J., concurring); First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (political speech “is at the heart 
of the First Amendment’s protections”).11  Because 
political speech warrants such heightened protection, 
this Court has stated that “[w]hen a law burdens 
core political speech, we apply ‘exacting scrutiny,’ 
and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly 
tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”  
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n., 514 U.S. 334, 
347 (1995) (citation omitted).   
 
 Here, plaintiffs’ proposed activities are not only 
political but constitute pure speech.  They do not 
seek protection for conduct engaged in for expressive 
purposes, but for speech itself.  The Court has 
insisted that pure speech warrants the highest 
protection, and has refused to apply relaxed scrutiny 
to criminal bans on pure expression.  See, e.g., Cohen 
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (treating 
conviction for wearing jacket with offensive message 
as based on pure speech, and subjecting it to 
heightened scrutiny); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (same for conviction 
based on “pure expression” under Georgia rape 
shield law).  See infra, Point V.A. 
 
 In considering each of plaintiffs’ legal challenges, 
therefore, the fact that the statute as applied here 
                                                 
11  See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring); T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS *421-22 (5th ed. 1883); Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN 
THE UNITED STATES (1941); Sunstein, Free Speech Now, in THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 304-07 (G. Stone, R. 
Epstein & C. Sunstein eds. 1992). 
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criminalizes pure political speech must trigger the 
Court’s most skeptical review.  
 
II. THE PROVISIONS ARE VAGUE AS 
APPLIED TO PLAINTIFFS’ INTENDED 
SPEECH 
 
 Congress defined “material support” to reach well 
beyond mere financial support and the provision of 
tangible goods.  By their terms, and as the 
government has interpreted them, the criminal 
prohibitions implicate a broad range of pure speech: 
“training” in any “specific skill”; “expert advice”; 
speaking, writing, or petitioning Congress or the 
United Nations “for the benefit of” a designated 
group; and coordinating one’s speech with a group in 
such a way as to act under its “direction or control.”  
These prohibitions fail to offer plaintiffs sufficiently 
clear guidance as to whether and to what extent 
their proposed speech is in fact prohibited. 
 
 A statute is vague if it causes “men of common 
intelligence ... necessarily [to] guess at its meaning 
and [to] differ as to its application.” Connally v. 
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).  The 
degree of precision required increases with the 
gravity of the penalty and the importance of the 
rights at stake.  Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 
(1982) (higher standard applicable for criminal 
statutes and when speech at stake).  Under well-
settled law, the material-support provisions at issue 
here are subject to the most stringent vagueness 
scrutiny for two reasons: they impose severe criminal 
sanctions, and they trench on speech and 
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associational rights. Id.; Reno v. American Civil 
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997); Baggett 
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372-73 (1964).12  All four 
provisions require ordinary persons to guess at their 
meaning.  They fail to draw the clear lines mandated 
by the Constitution where speech may trigger 
criminal sanctions.  
 
 A.  Training 
 
 The prohibition on “training” requires individuals 
to draw impossible distinctions between prohibited 
instruction in a “specific skill” and permissible 
instruction in “general knowledge.”  To determine 
whether their proposed teaching of human rights 
advocacy or peacemaking is proscribed, for example, 
plaintiffs must guess at whether they would be 
imparting “specific skills” or merely “general 
knowledge.”  If they guess wrong, they face up to 
fifteen years in prison.  
 
                                                 
12
  In its petition, the government maintained that “the 
material-support statute does not regulate speech,” and 
therefore does not warrant heightened vagueness scrutiny.  Pet. 
13.  That is simply false.  As demonstrated above, all of 
plaintiffs’ proposed activities are pure speech.  See supra, Point 
I.  When a statute prohibits “training,” defined as “instruction 
or teaching,” “expert advice,” and any advocacy done “for the 
benefit” of a designated group or under its “direction or control,” 
it directly criminalizes speech.  The government conceded as 
much in the lower courts, where it admitted that the statutory 
provisions would criminalize, among other things, the teaching 
of political geography or English, lobbying the United Nations 
and Congress, writing amicus briefs, and advocating for a 
designated group’s benefit on television or in the print press.  
See supra, pp. 12-13; infra, p. 27-28. 
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 The difficulty is that “general knowledge” and 
“specific skills,” much like “general” and 
“elaborated,” are “classic terms of degree,” and as 
such, provide “no principle for determining when … 
remarks pass from the safe harbor of the general to 
the forbidden sea of the [specific].”   Gentile v. State 
Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. at 1048-49 (holding 
unconstitutionally vague a state bar rule that 
allowed lawyers to make “general” remarks on 
pending criminal cases, but barred them from 
“elaborating”).  
 
 The government’s own attempts to explain the 
distinction suffice to establish its inescapable 
vagueness.  Before the court of appeals, counsel for 
the government opined that, under this definition, 
teaching geography would be permissible because it 
constitutes “general knowledge,” but teaching the 
political geography of terrorist organizations would 
constitute a banned “specific skill,” as would the 
teaching of English.13  But what if, during a 
“general” course on geography, a student’s question 
prompted a discussion of the political geography of 
terrorist organizations?  What if the course included 
a session on the science of geography, or the 
                                                 
13  The colloquy took place during the en banc oral argument, 
at approximately 49 minutes into the argument.  See Recording 
of En Banc Oral Argument, Dec. 14, 2004, available at 
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=00
00004506.  At the time of oral argument,  Congress had passed 
the 2004 amendments, but President Bush had not yet signed 
them into law.  See Statement by President George W. Bush 
Upon Signing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004, 40 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2985 (Dec. 
17, 2004).  Government counsel nonetheless addressed the new 
law’s definitions in the colloquy above. 
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geography of a specific region incorporating 
statistical information?  An ordinary person could 
only hazard a guess as to whether these are 
impermissible “specific skills,” or permissible aspects 
of “general knowledge.”   
 
 In the district court, government counsel 
similarly illustrated the profound difficulty of 
understanding the “training” prohibition.  
Defendants asserted in their brief that plaintiffs 
were free to advocate “on behalf of” the PKK before 
the United Nations or “any forum of their choosing,” 
even though they simultaneously asserted that any 
activity done “for the benefit of” a designated group 
would be a proscribed “service.”  Govt. Mem. in Supp. 
of S.J. at 17 n.8, 21 (July 17, 2005).  When the 
district court at oral argument asked whether 
plaintiffs could lobby the U.N. on the PKK’s behalf, 
government counsel first said that they could do so.  
D. Ct. Tr. 7-8, C.A. Supplemental Excerpts of Record 
(SER) 218-19.  When the court asked whether 
plaintiffs could meet with members of the PKK to 
discuss a strategy for lobbying the U.N., and then 
divide up into groups to carry it out, however, 
counsel opined that such conduct “presumably could” 
constitute prohibited “training,” D. Ct. Tr. 11, C.A. 
SER 220, and minutes later stated that it “clearly 
comes within the proscriptions against training and 
expert advice or assistance.”  D. Ct. Tr. 15; C.A. SER 
224.  At the close of the colloquy, the district court 
concluded, “I don’t know how you think anyone, a 
normal person, would figure this out based on this 
exchange.”  D. Ct. Tr. 19, C.A. SER 228.   
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 B.  Expert Advice or Assistance 
 
 The ban on providing “expert advice or 
assistance” is vague for many of the same reasons.  
It, too, directly criminalizes speech, and forces 
plaintiffs to guess whether any aspect of their advice 
could be said to “derive[] from scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge.”  The vagueness infects 
the entire prohibition, not just the “specialized 
knowledge” component. 
 
 Notably, the statute requires individuals to 
determine, not simply whether their speech is itself 
“technical,” “scientific,” or “specialized,” but, even 
more ambiguously, whether its content in any way 
“derives from” scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge.  Virtually all knowledge 
might be thought to derive from scientific, technical, 
or some other specialized knowledge, yet Congress 
plainly intended some limit.  The statute provides no 
coherent or reliable way to make the distinction.   
 
 The courts below correctly invalidated the 
“specialized knowledge” portion.  Like “general” and 
“elaboration,” “specialized” is a “classic term of 
degree,” and fails to afford notice of what is 
prohibited.  Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048-49. Judge 
Fertig could not risk providing advice about 
presenting human rights claims to the United 
Nations unless he was certain that his advice was 
derived from “general knowledge” and included no 
statement informed by “specialized knowledge.”  But 
how does one distinguish which aspects of human 
rights derive from general as opposed to specialized 
knowledge?  And because providing advice generally 
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involves a conversation, how can one know whether 
one’s responses to questions might stray into a 
subject that could be said to be “derived from … 
specialized knowledge” (or, for that matter, 
“scientific [or] technical” knowledge)?  A large share 
(perhaps most) of general knowledge consists of 
“specialized knowledge” that has come to be widely 
known, so is literally “derived from” specialized 
knowledge.  How are plaintiffs to tell the difference? 
 
 Having correctly deemed the ban on advice 
“derived from … specialized knowledge” to be 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to plaintiffs’ 
speech, the courts below erroneously upheld the ban 
on advice “derived from scientific [or] technical … 
knowledge.”  No sound rationale supports the latter 
conclusion.  Indeed, the court of appeals proffered no 
rationale, but merely cited two sources indicating 
that “technical” and  “scientific method” are fifth-
grade and third-grade level vocabulary words, 
respectively.  Pet. App. 24a.  
 
 This misconceives the duty of a court in assessing 
a vagueness challenge.  The question is not whether 
the terms are widely known, but whether they 
provide sufficient notice of what is prohibited in the 
context of a criminal law trenching on First 
Amendment rights.  Many words on grammar school 
vocabulary lists would not pass that test, or even 
more lenient tests of vagueness.  See Coates v. 
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (declaring vague a 
city ordinance banning “annoying” behavior).  
“Monstrous,” “tremendous,” “awesome,” “incredible,” 
“intense,” and “dreadful” are all on a third-grade 
vocabulary list, but would hardly be permissible 
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terms to specify prohibited activity in a criminal 
statute.14  Indeed, the word “specializes,” which the 
court rightly deemed vague (in the form, 
“specialized”), is on one of the fourth grade lists from 
the same source the court cited.15  
  
 The “expert advice” prohibition leaves citizens 
without meaningful guidance, and gives prosecutors 
and juries broad discretion to target unpopular 
speech.  See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-
09 (1972).  In one common usage, what knowledge is 
“technical” or “specialized” will depend entirely on 
what one’s assumed audience already knows or 
remembers or how much effort will be required to 
take it in.  High school algebra, for example, might 
be “technical” or “specialized” for one audience, but 
“general knowledge” for another.  So, too, speech 
addressing human rights, lobbying, or public 
relations could be deemed to involve “general 
knowledge” or instead to derive from “technical” and 
“specialized” knowledge, depending on the 
sophistication of the audience.  Speech that might or 
might not be proscribed based on its potential effect 
on a listener is clearly vague, for the speaker has no 
way of gauging listeners’ reactions.  See Federal 
Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 
551 U.S. 449, 494-95 (2007). 
 
 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
(1993) defines “technical” to mean, inter alia: (1) 
“having special us[ually] practical knowledge 
                                                 
14  Houghton Mifflin Reading Spelling and Vocabulary Word 
Lists, www-kes.stjohns.k12.fl.us/wordlists/3rd/vocab3.htm.   
15  Id., www-kes.stjohns.k12.fl.us/wordlists/4th/vocab5.htm. 
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especially of a mechanical or scientific subject,” (2) 
“marked by or characteristic of specialization,” (3) “of 
or relating to a particular subject,” and (4) “of or 
relating to technique.”  Id. at 2348.  It defines 
“specialized” to mean, inter alia, “designed or fitted for 
use or employment in one special line (as of 
occupation).”  Id. at 2186.  Virtually all advice could 
be said to “derive” from knowledge relating to a 
“particular subject,” “technique,” “line,” or 
“occupation.”  Congress meant to excise something 
when it carved out advice derived from non-
specialized knowledge, but the language it employed 
offers little guidance.   
 
 “Scientific” also leaves vast room for uncertainty.  
The term means “of, relating to, or used in science.”  
Id. at 2032.  “Science,” in turn, means, inter alia: (1) 
“possession of knowledge as distinguished from 
ignorance or misunderstanding,” (2) “a branch or 
department of systematized knowledge that is or can 
be made a specific object of study;” or (3) “knowledge 
classified and made available in work, life, or the 
search for truth.”  Id.  Debates rage about when, or 
the extent to which, disciplines have become 
“scientific” (economics? psychology? geography? 
political science?).  Would advice on presenting 
torture claims to a human rights tribunal be barred 
because assessing whether someone has been the 
victim of torture may in part derive from “scientific” 
or “technical” knowledge?  Would advice for peace 
negotiations that addressed such issues as allocation 
of natural resources, energy use, transportation, or 
voting and representational arrangements be barred 
as derived from scientific or technical knowledge?  
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 The government has defended the statutory 
definition by noting its similarity to the definition of 
“expert testimony” under Rule 702 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  Pet. 15.  But here, as elsewhere 
in the law, “context matters.”  Gonzales v. O Centro 
Espiritu Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
431 (2006); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 
(2003).  That a particular standard may suffice as a 
guide to discretionary judgment calls made by 
trained judges (who do not risk going to jail for a 
mistake) does not mean that it can be imposed on the 
general public on pain of fifteen years’ imprisonment.  
See Pet. App. 66a (finding that Rule 702 “does not 
clarify the term ... for the average person with no 
background in the law”).  It cannot seriously be 
doubted that a statute making it a crime to publish 
anything derived from “scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge” would be unconstitutionally 
vague – just as would a statute making it a crime to 
publish information whose prejudicial or confusing 
character outweighed its probative value, even 
though that, too, is a standard routinely applied by 
judges.  Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
 
  Moreover, the “expert advice or assistance” 
definition is radically more open-ended than Rule 
702.  It requires citizens to guess not only at what 
constitutes scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge, but at what is “derived” from such 
knowledge, an even more capacious and ambiguous 
category.   
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 C.  Service  
 
 The most expansive provision in the definition of 
“material support” is the prohibition on providing 
any “service” to a designated group, which Congress 
added in 2004 without supplying a definition.  The 
courts below correctly held this prohibition 
unconstitutionally vague, as it provides literally no 
guidance as to what speech is prohibited or 
permitted.   
 
 Citing a dictionary, the government maintains 
that the term prohibits any “act done for the benefit 
... of another.”  Pet. 17.  But how does one determine 
whether a speech, for example, about the human 
rights of Kurds is done “for the benefit of” the PKK?  
What about a letter to the State Department 
objecting to the detention on political grounds of a 
PKK member?  When the New York Times, 
Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times published 
op-ed essays by Hamas spokespersons in the past 
two years, were they violating the law by providing a 
“service” to a designated group?16  
 
                                                 
16
  See Mousa Abu Marzook, Hamas Speaks, L.A. Times, Jan. 
6, 2009, at A15 (by deputy of the political bureau of Hamas); 
Mahmoud al-Zahar, No Peace Without Hamas, Wash. Post, Apr. 
17, 2008, at A23 (by founder of Hamas and foreign minister in 
Hamas led government); Ahmed Yousef, What Hamas Wants, 
N.Y. Times, June 20, 2007, at A19 (by political adviser to 
Hamas leader Ismaiel Haniya); Ahmed Yousef, Engage With 
Hamas, We Earned Our Support, Wash. Post, June 20, 2007, at 
A19.  Hamas is a designated “foreign terrorist organization.”   
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
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 At the same time that the government contends 
that “service” prohibits anything done “for the 
benefit of” a designated group, it also contends that 
advocating “on behalf of the PKK” is permitted (so 
long as one also avoids acting at “the direction of” the 
proscribed group, which would constitute the 
provision of “personnel”).  Govt. Mem. in Supp. of 
S.J. at 17 n.8; see also D. Ct. Tr. 7; C.A. SER 218.  
Thus, Judge Fertig and the HLP must attempt to 
distinguish between speaking “on behalf of” the 
PKK, which is assertedly permissible, and speaking 
“for the benefit of” the PKK, which is a crime.  The 
government has yet to explain how speech on an 
organization’s behalf would not also be for its benefit.  
Yet a fifteen-year criminal sentence could turn on 
the distinction.   
 
 The “service” prohibition also forces individuals to 
guess whether joining or affiliating with a group is 
prohibited.  Before the “service” prohibition was 
added in 2004, the government represented that 
citizens were free under the material-support statute 
to join designated groups, and that concession was 
critical to the court of appeals’ rejection of plaintiffs’ 
right-of-association challenge.  Humanitarian Law 
Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 
2000) (rejecting First Amendment right-of-
association challenge because the statute permits 
membership and affiliation with foreign terrorist 
organizations).  But with the statute’s new ban on 
“service,” membership and affiliation are now in 
doubt.  A reasonable person could readily understand 
any joining or affiliating with a political organization 
to be “for [its] benefit.”  How can one distinguish 
between ostensibly permitted membership and 
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association, on the one hand, and “service,” on the 
other?  Such confusion is intolerable where, as here, 
criminal prosecution for activities protected by the 
First Amendment is at stake.   
 
 D.  Personnel 
 
 Two separate panels of the court of appeals 
unanimously held that the statute’s original ban on 
providing “personnel” criminalized protected speech 
and was unconstitutionally vague.  See supra, note 9.  
After Congress amended the provision in 2004 to 
limit “personnel” to persons acting under a recipient 
organization’s “direction or control,” while exempting 
“entirely independent” activity, the court held that 
the “personnel” ban sufficiently apprises individuals 
of the proscribed zone.  Pet. App. 26a-27a. 
 
 The amended definition of “personnel,” however, 
continues to leave the statute’s reach intolerably 
vague.  “Direction or control” could mean many 
things of potential, but uncertain, applicability to the 
speech plaintiffs propose.  The fact that Congress 
drafted a narrow exception only for “entirely 
independent” activity leaves citizens wondering 
whether the prohibition covers all or just some parts 
of the vast gray area between complete control and 
complete independence, encompassing myriad forms 
of coordination, collaboration, consultation, and 
communication.   
 
 For example, what if Judge Fertig offered his 
legal services to work with the PKK in presenting a 
human rights petition to the U.N.?  A lawyer might 
well be said to act under the “direction” of his client, 
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as, subject only to professional obligations, the 
client’s wishes are controlling.  But when this very 
issue arose in the prosecution of a lawyer under the 
“personnel” provision, the government opined that a 
lawyer acting as “house counsel” would be acting 
impermissibly under the organization’s “direction or 
control,” but an outside counsel doing the same work 
could be seen as “independent.”  United States v. 
Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
The court in Sattar concluded that such distinctions 
were too unclear to pass muster, and declared the 
“personnel” ban unconstitutionally vague.  Id.17 
 
 If plaintiffs wanted to write an op-ed essay 
defending the PKK and criticizing its designation as 
“terrorist,” would coordinating the drafting with a 
PKK leader constitute criminal acceptance of 
“direction”?  A reasonable person might fear that 
such collaboration would negate a claim that the 
essay was written “entirely independently.”  What if 
the author accepted three of the leader’s five 
editorial suggestions, or only two?  What if the 
author coordinated with the PKK the timing of the 
essay’s submission for publication?  Any coordination 
at all might risk prosecution.  
 
 For related reasons, the “personnel” provision is 
vague with respect to associational rights.  It does 
                                                 
17  The Sattar case preceded the 2004 amendment to the 
“personnel” prohibition, but the government in that case 
maintained that the “personnel” prohibition should be 
construed as limited to action under a designated group’s 
“direction or control.”  See Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 360.  
Government counsel’s explication therefore remains relevant to 
the meaning of the amended statute, which expressly adopted 
the “direction or control” limitation. 
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not provide an adequate distinction between 
membership in or affiliation with a designated group, 
which the government has said the statute permits, 
cf. HLP I, 205 F.3d at 1134, and providing the group 
with “personnel,” which is a crime.  In the Sattar 
case, the government was unable to articulate any 
coherent distinction between the two actions: 
 
When asked at oral argument how to 
distinguish being a member of an organization 
from being a quasi-employee, the government 
initially responded “You know it when you see 
it.” ... While such a standard was once an 
acceptable way for a Supreme Court Justice to 
identify obscenity, see Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring), it 
is an insufficient guide by which a person can 
predict the legality of that person’s conduct. See 
United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 104 
(2d Cir. 2002) (“It is not enough to say that 
judges can intuit the scope of the prohibition if 
[the defendants] could not.”) 
 
Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 359-60.  The amended 
definition does nothing to clarify how one can 
associate with a designated group without acting in 
some respect under its “direction or control.” 
Plaintiffs reasonably fear that any affiliation or 
collaboration may render them criminally liable.   
 
 E.   The Interaction of the Provisions 
Exacerbates Their Vagueness 
 
 The confusion generated by each of the above 
prohibitions is exacerbated by their interaction.  The 
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provisions, read together, are hopelessly 
contradictory, or at least their collective meaning is 
so muddled as to leave would-be speakers uncertain 
about what is forbidden.  Similar contradictions have 
supported invalidation for lack of constitutionally 
required fair notice even when speech was not at 
issue.  See, e.g., United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 
174, 176-77 (1952); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 
(1959). 
 
 For example, the “service” prohibition appears to 
conflict with the narrowing limitations Congress 
simultaneously placed in the definitions of 
“training,” “expert advice,” and “personnel.”  
Teaching a subject of “general knowledge” or 
providing advice derived from non-specialized 
knowledge is expressly carved out of the “training” 
and “expert advice” provisions, but if done “for the 
benefit of” a designated group it would appear to be 
prohibited as a service.  (Indeed, what training or 
advice would not be done “for the benefit of” the 
group?)  Similarly, the “personnel” definition 
exempts acts done “entirely independently of the … 
organization to advance its goals or objectives,” 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B(h), but such activity could reasonably 
be thought to be “for the benefit of” the organization, 
and therefore simultaneously proscribed by the 
“service” prohibition.   
 
 Congress specifically provided that the statute 
should not be construed or applied to outlaw 
protected speech, id. § 2339B(i), but publishing an 
article praising the humanitarian work of a 
designated organization to improve its reputation 
would be simultaneously protected speech and 
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presumably a service done “for the benefit of” the 
organization.  Is it, then, criminal or not?  One can 
only guess. 
 
 Likewise, training or legal advice on a subject of 
“general knowledge” would presumably not be a 
crime under the definitions of “training” and “expert 
advice,” but would be a crime if its provision involved 
coordination with the group that amounted to acting 
under its direction.  
 
 Navigating through the internally contradictory 
signals of these overlapping provisions is simply 
impossible.  Reading the provisions together, a 
would-be speaker would find it a mystery what 
Congress thought it was prohibiting and permitting.   
 
 F. The Government’s Defense of the 
Challenged Provisions Fails to Account 
for the Fact that They Criminalize Pure 
Speech 
 
 Rather than attempt to answer the many 
questions raised about the meaning of the challenged 
terms, the government in its petition merely cited 
inapposite examples from contexts where First 
Amendment interests and/or criminal penalties were 
not at stake.  Pet. 13-18.  But as noted above, 
vagueness standards are at their most demanding 
when a criminal prohibition affects speech.  Reno v. 
American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. at 871-72.  
Many of the cases the government cited do not even 
address vagueness, and all arise from non-speech or 
non-criminal contexts that tolerate more lenient 
vagueness standards – determining an appropriate 
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attorney’s fee (Pet. 15),18 admitting expert evidence 
in court (Pet. 16),19 prohibiting the overseas transfer 
of money (Pet. 17)20 or heavy equipment (Pet. 18),21 
or noncriminal regulation of public employees’ 
speech (Pet. 14).22  These cases have no bearing on 
                                                 
18  Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1988), involved 
the standards employed for awarding statutory attorneys’ fees.  
It presented no vagueness challenge, and did not involve a 
criminal statute at all, much less a prohibition of speech.   
19  Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 
(1999), did not address any vagueness issue, and as noted 
above, involved the very different setting of evidentiary 
standards for judicial governance of a trial.   
20  United States v. Homa Int’l Trading Corp., 387 F.3d 144, 
146 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that transferring money for a fee 
was undeniably a service, where no issues of speech were 
raised). 
21  United States v. Hescorp, Heavy Equip. Sales Corp., 801 
F.2d 70, 73-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018 (1986), 
upheld a conviction for shipping construction equipment to Iran 
in violation of a complete ban on such transactions. No speech 
or associational rights were at stake.  Defendants made what 
the court characterized as a “tortured” argument that a 
separate provision of the statute, governing “service contracts,” 
should be construed to create a loophole permitting what the 
statute plainly forbade.  The court rejected that interpretation 
as wholly inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute’s 
flat ban, and accordingly also rejected defendants’ related 
argument that the statute, as they had tortuously construed it, 
was unconstitutionally vague. 
22  The government’s one cited authority involving speech is 
California Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141 
(9th Cir. 2001).  There, the court rejected a facial vagueness 
challenge to a law that required public school teachers to use 
English predominantly in their instruction.  In that context, 
involving the somewhat curtailed speech interests of public 
employees in public schools and no apparent criminal penalties, 
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plaintiffs’ challenge, which tests the validity of terms 
used to criminalize pure political speech.  In the 
present setting, the demand for clarity is at its 
zenith, because otherwise citizens will be forced to 
steer clear of anything approaching the prohibited 
zone, and free speech will be the loser.  That the 
statutes at issue have deterred plaintiffs for so long 
from providing training and assistance in human 
rights and peacemaking, and from advocating on 
behalf of disadvantaged ethnic minorities, illustrates 
that the dangers of vague prohibitions are all too 
real.  
 
G. The Provisions Are Overbroad Because 
Their Application to a Substantial 
Amount of Speech Is Unclear  
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the provisions at issue 
are vague as applied to plaintiffs’ proposed speech.  
The same arguments also support a broader 
conclusion, namely, that the vagueness of the terms 
as applied to all speech renders the provisions 
facially invalid.  
 
 While there is undoubtedly a small fraction of 
pure speech that could constitutionally be prohibited, 
such as incitement to crime, the statute makes no 
attempt to limit its application to such speech.  
Instead, it prohibits all speech that constitutes 
                                                                                                    
the court explained that the law made clear that “instruction” 
was tied to the “curriculum,” and on that basis found no 
substantial number of instances where there would be doubt 
about when English had to be used (for classroom presentation 
of the curriculum), and when it did not (in private 
conversations with students and parents).  
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“training,” “expert advice,” “service,” or “personnel.”  
These provisions are profoundly unclear in what they 
prohibit, not just as applied to plaintiffs’ proposed 
speech, but as applied to a seemingly limitless range 
of teaching, advice, and advocacy of lawful activity, 
all of which is constitutionally protected.  See infra, 
Point III.  The vagueness of the provisions as applied 
to this wide variety of speech renders the statute 
substantially overbroad on its face; indeed, the 
apparent prohibitions of protected speech dwarf their 
application to unprotected speech.  See United States 
v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008) (noting that  
“in the First Amendment context, [we] permit[] 
plaintiffs to argue that a statute is overbroad 
because it is unclear whether it regulates a 
substantial amount of protected speech”); Broadrick 
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).   
 
III. THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS 
IMPERMISSIBLY CRIMINALIZE PURE 
SPEECH AND DISCRIMINATE ON THE 
BASIS OF CONTENT 
  
 The challenged provisions independently violate 
the First Amendment because they impermissibly 
criminalize pure political speech advocating lawful, 
nonviolent activity, and discriminate on the basis of 
the speech’s content.23  Throughout this litigation, 
                                                 
23  Plaintiffs argued below that the material-support statute 
as a whole, as well as the specific provisions at issue here, were 
invalid as applied and on their face because they were content-
based and overbroad penalties on speech, and because they 
imposed guilt by association, in violation of the First and Fifth 
Amendments.  The court of appeals rejected those contentions.  
Plaintiffs have preserved the arguments, and they are 
independent bases for affirming the injunction below, and for 
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the government has never cited, and we are unaware 
of, any authority from this Court upholding such 
blanket criminalization of pure political speech that 
seeks to further only lawful, nonviolent activities.   
 
 Three features of the challenged provisions as 
applied here are critical to the First Amendment 
analysis.  First, as noted above, plaintiffs’ proposed 
speech is pure political speech.  See supra, Point I. 
Human rights advocacy, peacemaking, petitioning 
for redress of grievances, and advocacy on behalf of 
ethnic minorities are at the core of what the First 
Amendment protects.   
 
 Second, the challenged provisions impose a 
complete criminal prohibition on such speech.  The 
challenged provisions do not constitute a zoning 
regulation, a regulation of the time, place, or manner 
of speech, or a regulation of conduct – expressive or 
otherwise.  Rather, they work a complete ban of 
certain kinds of constitutionally protected speech.   
 
 Third, the provisions discriminate based on 
content, favoring or disfavoring speech depending on 
whether it imparts “specific skills” or “general 
knowledge,” is “for the benefit of” a group, or consists 
of “religious materials” or non-religious materials.  
And all of the provisions selectively prohibit speech 
only when it is communicated to, at the direction of, 
or for the benefit of particular political organizations. 
 
 These factors trigger the most stringent scrutiny, 
and the provisions manifestly fail that scrutiny. 
                                                                                                    
expanding it as plaintiffs request in their cross-petition.   
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 A.   Strict Scrutiny Applies Because the 
Challenged Provisions Criminally 
Proscribe Pure Political Speech  
 
 Despite the use of the term “material support,” 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B is not limited to barring financial 
support, tangible goods, and the like.  Rather, its 
criminal sanctions extend to pure speech itself.  And 
according to the government, the statute’s 
prohibitions reach even speech that is designed to 
discourage terrorism and to promote only lawful, 
nonviolent activities.  Only a “‘need … of the highest 
order’” can justify “a regulation of pure speech.”  
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 532, 526; Cox Broadcasting, 
420 U.S. at 495 (applying strict scrutiny to statute 
penalizing “pure expression”); Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. at 18-19 (applying strict scrutiny to 
conviction for pure expression).    
 
 The fact that the statute imposes a complete 
criminal ban rather than a time, place, or manner 
regulation underscores the need for exacting 
scrutiny.  This Court has applied more relaxed 
scrutiny to laws that impose content-neutral 
restrictions on the time, place, or manner of speech, 
but do not criminalize it altogether.  See, e.g., Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1999) 
(upholding restriction on volume of speech in public 
park as “time, place, or manner” regulation where it 
was content-neutral and left open ample alternative 
avenues for expression).  The provisions challenged 
here criminalize plaintiffs’ speech altogether, thereby 
triggering the First Amendment’s most skeptical 
scrutiny.  City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 
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535 U.S. 425, 443 (2002) (plurality) (“[A]n ordinance 
warrants intermediate scrutiny only if it is a time, 
place, and manner regulation and not a ban.”); id. at 
445 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (same).  
 
 Here, the statute flatly bans certain kinds of 
speech to designated organizations, e.g., training of 
or advising their members.  Such a ban on speech to 
a chosen audience, indeed willing listeners, triggers 
strict First Amendment scrutiny.24  Similarly, 
nothing less than strict scrutiny can apply to a law 
that criminally punishes, as a “service” or provision 
of “personnel,” speech advocating peaceable 
nonviolent activity that is delivered for a designated 
organization’s benefit, or under its direction.  See De 
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), discussed infra 
pp. 53-55.  
 
 The fact that the statute reaches speech that 
implicates foreign affairs does not reduce the need 
for stringent First Amendment review.  Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (striking down regulation 
barring demonstrations that criticized foreign 
governments within 500 feet of a foreign embassy).  
Political speech is central to self-government, 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 274 U.S. 357, 375 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), and self-
government includes foreign as well as domestic 
                                                 
24  FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 
364, 384 (1984) (ban on editorializing denies “the right to 
address their chosen audience on matters of public importance”) 
(emphasis added); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 335 (2003) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (a law 
“that would allow a speaker to say anything he chooses, so long 
as his intended audience could not hear him,” would be 
“unconstitutional under any known First Amendment theory”).   
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affairs.  International communications are a central 
aspect of the robust public debate that the First 
Amendment is designed to protect.  Lamont v. 
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (protecting 
First Amendment rights of Americans to receive 
Communist literature from abroad).  
 
 B.   Strict Scrutiny Applies Because the 
Provisions Discriminate on the Basis of 
Content  
 
 Laws that discriminate on the basis of content, 
even if they do not impose criminal bans, also trigger 
the Court’s most stringent scrutiny.  “A statute is 
presumptively inconsistent with the First 
Amendment” if it discriminates against “speakers 
because of the content of their speech.”  Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State 
Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991); see 
also United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“Since [the law] is a 
content-based speech restriction, it can stand only if 
it satisfies strict scrutiny.”). 
 
 “[W]hether a statute is content neutral or content 
based is something that can be determined on the 
face of it; if the statute describes speech by its 
content, then it is content based.”  Alameda Books, 
535 U.S. at 448 (Kennedy, J., concurring); FCC v. 
League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 
383 (1984) (finding ban on “editorializing” content-
based because authorities “must necessarily examine 
the content of the message that is conveyed to 
determine whether the views expressed” are 
proscribed). 
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 Most of the challenged provisions discriminate on 
the basis of content in obvious ways.  The “training” 
ban prohibits instruction or teaching where its 
content consists of imparting “specific skills,” but not 
“general knowledge.”  Cf. Arkansas Writers’ Project, 
Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987) (state law 
that imposed tax on “general interest” magazines but 
not professional, trade, sports, and religious 
magazines was content-based).  The “expert advice” 
ban criminalizes the giving of advice only when its 
content “derives from scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge.”  And the “service” ban, as 
the government reads it, prohibits speech expressed 
“for the benefit of” a designated group, but not 
speech that criticizes the group.  At the same time, 
the statute expressly favors speech with religious 
content, permitting unlimited donations of 
“religious” but not secular materials.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339A(b) (exempting “medicine or religious 
materials” from the material-support ban).   
 
 All the challenged provisions, moreover, including 
the “personnel” provision, discriminate in an 
additional way.  They punish speakers for speech 
communicated to, for the benefit of, or directed by 
certain organizations but not others, with the 
government making the selection based on 
inherently political assessments about whether a 
group’s activities are consistent with United States 
“foreign policy” or “economic interests.”  Just as 
statutes that discriminate against selected speakers 
are suspect,25 so, too, is the discrimination as to a 
                                                 
25  See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc. v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 173, 190 (1999) (government cannot 
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speaker’s chosen audience, beneficiary, or director 
here. This is a form of content discrimination: speech 
to, for the benefit of, or under the direction of the 
PKK is treated as pro-PKK, and therefore 
criminalized, whereas otherwise-comparable speech 
to, for the benefit of, or under the direction of the 
PLO, no matter how pro-PLO, is allowed.26  
 
 Just as a law banning speech to or for the benefit 
of the Republican Party while permitting the same 
speech to or for the benefit of the Democratic Party 
would be content-based, so, too, is a law that selects 
the PKK, LTTE, and other groups from among 
countless similar organizations around the world on 
                                                                                                    
restrict advertising for private casinos while allowing 
advertising for tribal casinos); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. 
v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582 (1983) (a 
tax that “singled out the press for special treatment” is 
unconstitutional); Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (“we have frequently condemned … 
discrimination among different users of the same medium for 
expression.”); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85 (“In the realm of 
protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified 
from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and 
the speakers who may address a public issue.”) (citing Mosley, 
408 U.S. at 96). 
26  Government counsel made this content-discriminatory 
purpose clear at oral argument before the court of appeals.  
Asked whether filing an amicus brief on behalf of the LTTE in 
this case would be a crime, counsel replied, “Yes because 
Congress wants these organizations to be radioactive. … We 
don’t want U.S. lawyers, other U.S. persons, to be saying, ‘Yeah, 
I want to help them in a good way,’ because that adds to the 
goodwill and the standing of the organization.”  C.A. Oral 
Argument Tape, supra note 7, at 34:30.  The government’s 
concern, in other words, is with speech that sends a message 
that a disfavored organization is legitimate and deserves 
goodwill.   
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expressly political grounds, and then proscribes 
speech that sends messages that promote those 
groups’ “goodwill.”  See supra, note 26.    
 
 The government argues that the statute is 
content-neutral because it is motivated by the 
legitimate purpose of deterring terrorist activity.  
Pet. 19-20.  But the asserted legitimacy of the 
government’s motive does not change the fact that 
the statute contains provisions that are content-
based on their face.  A law that banned all speech 
praising terrorism would indisputably be content-
based, even if it were motivated by the same purpose 
of deterring terrorist activity.  The “assertion of a 
content neutral purpose [is not] enough to save a law 
which, on its face, discriminates based on content.”  
Turner Broadcasting System Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 642 (1994); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 117 
(“[I]llicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a 
violation of the First Amendment”).27 
 
                                                 
27  Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), does not alter this 
conclusion.  In Hill, the Court upheld a law that regulated the 
manner in which speakers could approach individuals within 
100 feet of a health care facility.  The Court viewed the law as a 
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, emphasizing 
that it was content-neutral, only regulated the manner in which 
speech could be expressed to unwilling listeners, and left ample 
alternative channels for communication.  Id. at 719-30.  Over 
dissents, the majority deemed the statutory language, 
addressing “oral protest, education, or counseling,” as 
equivalent to a neutral regulation of “picketing.”  Id. at 721.  
Here, by contrast, the challenged provisions impose a complete 
ban, not a regulation of the manner of speech, and the ban is 
expressly content-based.  Indeed, in over ten years of litigation, 
the government has never even sought to defend the challenged 
provisions as a “time, place, or manner” regulation. 
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 C.  The Challenged Provisions Cannot 
Survive Strict Scrutiny 
 
 “When a law burdens core political speech, we 
apply ‘exacting scrutiny,’ and we uphold the 
restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an 
overriding state interest.”  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm., 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).  Content-based 
laws may be upheld only where the government 
establishes that the particular content distinctions 
drawn are “the least restrictive means” to further a 
compelling state interest.  Sable Communications of 
California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).  
Importantly, the Court has repeatedly held that pure 
political speech like plaintiffs’, advocating peaceable, 
nonviolent ends, may not be criminalized in order to 
forestall others from engaging in illegal conduct, 
even where that illegal conduct threatens national 
security.        
 
 While combating terrorism is undoubtedly a 
compelling state interest, the government has not 
shown that criminalizing pure political speech 
advocating peaceful, lawful activities is necessary to 
further that interest.  Nor has it pointed to anything 
in the legislative record – in 1996, in 2001, or in 2004 
– that reflects a specific congressional focus on such 
speech, let alone a determination that banning it is 
necessary or, even, advisable.  The congressional 
expressions of concern to protect speech suggest the 
contrary.  See Statement, supra, p. 7.  There is 
simply no evidence in the litigation or legislative 
records to show that criminally proscribing speech 
promoting peaceable, lawful conduct will further the 
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interest in reducing terrorist activity at all, much 
less that it is necessary to do so.   
 
 In defending the statute’s prohibitions on 
financial support, the government below relied on 
the notion that money is “fungible,” so that support 
for lawful activities might free up resources that the 
recipient organization can use for terrorist activity.  
But that theory, about money, has no application to 
the speech at issue in this as-applied challenge.  
Indeed, the 1996 congressional “finding” that the 
government relies upon is by its terms limited to 
“contributions.”  See Statement, supra, p. 7.  And if 
the finding were applied to speech advocating lawful, 
nonviolent activity, it would deserve no deference, as 
it lacks any evidentiary support.  See Bartnicki, 532 
U.S. at 530-31 & n.17 (dismissing congressional 
finding advanced to support statute criminalizing 
speech because “the relevant factual foundation is 
not to be found in the legislative record”). 
 
 More importantly, the Court has repeatedly 
rejected the proposition that otherwise-lawful speech 
may be prohibited in order to deter criminal conduct 
by a third party.  In Bartnicki, for example, the 
Court held unconstitutional a civil statute that 
penalized the publication of illegally intercepted cell 
phone conversations as applied to an individual who 
had obtained the communications legally (from 
someone else who had illegally intercepted them).  
The Court rejected the government’s attempt to 
justify the statute on the ground that it would deter 
illegal interceptions by others: “It would be quite 
remarkable to hold that speech by a law-abiding 
possessor of information can be suppressed in order 
  
53 
to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party.”  
Id. at 529-30.  Similarly, plaintiffs’ speech, 
advocating only lawful, nonviolent activities, cannot 
be proscribed on the basis of mere speculation that 
such a prohibition might somehow deter the PKK or 
the LTTE from engaging in terrorist activity. 
 
 Similarly, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 
535 U.S. 234 (2002), the Court struck down a federal 
statute banning “virtual child pornography,” and 
rejected the government’s argument that the 
restriction was necessary because such materials 
might be used to seduce children, or might increase 
demand for child pornography using actual children.  
As the Court explained, “the government may not 
prohibit speech because it increases the chance an 
unlawful act will be committed ‘at some indefinite 
future time.’”  Id. at 253 (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 
414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam)).  Here, as in 
Free Speech Coalition, “the harm does not 
necessarily follow from the speech, but depends upon 
some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal 
acts.”  Id. at 250.   
 
 This principle dates back to some of the Court’s 
earliest First Amendment decisions.  In De Jonge v. 
United States, 299 U.S. 353, the Court invalidated a 
conviction under a criminal syndicalism statute of an 
individual who spoke on behalf of the Communist 
Party at a meeting held under Party auspices, at 
which he sought to recruit members to the Party.  
The Court accepted that the Party engaged in illegal 
activities, and that De Jonge acted under the Party’s 
auspices, but held that he could not be convicted 
because he advocated only “peaceable” activity.  Id. 
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at 365.  The Court noted that if individuals are 
“engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace 
and order, they may be prosecuted for their 
conspiracy.”  Id.  But, the Court continued, “it is a 
different matter when the State, instead of 
prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere 
participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful 
public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.”  
Id.   
 
 In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 
908-09, 932-34, the Court relied on De Jonge to hold 
that the leader of and participants in an economic 
boycott could not be held liable for illegal violence 
that attended the boycott absent proof that they 
engaged in or directly incited the violence.  Id. at 928 
(“[W]hen an advocate’s] appeals do not incite lawless 
action, they must be regarded as protected speech.”).    
 
 Even where speech directly advocates criminal 
conduct, the Court has held that it may not be 
penalized unless it is in fact intended and likely to 
produce “imminent lawless action.”  Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Hess v. Indiana, 414 
U.S. at 108-09 (holding that the First Amendment 
prohibits application of a disorderly conduct statute 
to pure speech that, while advocating illegal activity, 
did not incite it).  If the government is not permitted 
to penalize direct advocacy of illegal activity except 
in circumstances where it constitutes incitement to 
imminent crime, surely it cannot criminalize 
plaintiffs’ proposed speech, which promotes only 
lawful, peaceful activities, and does not urge 
criminal conduct of any kind.   
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 The government will not be deprived of its 
considerable arsenal of legal tools to combat 
terrorism if the limited provisions at issue here are 
invalidated as applied to speech advocating 
peaceable, nonviolent action.  Indeed, given 
Congress’s statement that the material-support 
statute may not be “construed or applied” in ways 
that violate the First Amendment, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B(i), it is doubtful that Congress even intended 
to criminalize such speech.  See infra, Point VI.  
Plaintiffs’ requested relief would leave the statute in 
place, to be employed against those providing 
material support in the form of financial aid and 
other non-speech support, as well as against those 
whose speech is unprotected.  In addition, the 
government would still be able to invoke other laws 
to prosecute those who support terrorist activity, 
conspire to engage in terrorist activity, or aid or abet 
such activity.28  The government has made no 
showing that any successful prosecution under 
§ 2339B would have been prevented if speech 
advocating lawful, nonviolent activity were 
protected.  
 
 In short, the government has utterly failed to 
meet its heavy burden of justification under strict 
scrutiny.      
 
                                                 
28  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (prohibiting material support 
of terrorist crimes); 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (prohibiting financing of 
terrorism with knowledge that the funds will be used for 
specific offenses); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (Racketeering 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); 18 U.S.C. § 2 
(aiding and abetting); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy). 
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IV. THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS 
VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 The challenged provisions also violate the right of 
association.  As discussed above, the challenged 
provisions penalize speech only when it is 
communicated to, for the benefit of, or under the 
direction or control of disfavored associations.  See 
supra, Point III.B.  This association-based trigger for 
penalizing speech violates the First and Fifth 
Amendments.  In addition, the “service” and 
“personnel” provisions directly penalize association 
because, as noted above, the mere act of joining or 
associating with a group could be viewed as 
benefiting the group or acting at the group’s 
“direction.”  See supra, Point II.C-D. 
 
 This Court has confronted similar penalties 
triggered by association with disfavored 
organizations before.  In the 1950s, Congress 
imposed analogous restrictions on the Communist 
Party, after expressly finding that it was a foreign-
dominated organization that used terrorism and 
other illegal means in seeking to overthrow the 
United States by force and violence.29  This Court did 
not question Congress’s findings regarding the 
Communist Party’s illegal ends and terrorist means, 
but nonetheless insisted that the First and Fifth 
                                                 
29  Congress found that there “exists a world Communist 
movement … whose purpose it is, by treachery, deceit, 
infiltration … espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other 
means deemed necessary, to establish a Communist totalitarian 
dictatorship in the countries throughout the world through the 
medium of a world-wide Communist organization.”  50 U.S.C. 
§ 781 (West 1991) (repealed 1993), quoted in Aptheker v. Sec’y of 
State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 n.8 (1964).   
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Amendments precluded any penalty for association 
with the Communist Party unless an individual 
specifically intended to further its unlawful ends.30  
 
 De Jonge v. Oregon, discussed above, 
demonstrates that the principle fully applies to 
active association with organizations engaged in 
illegal activity.  The Court there unanimously 
reversed De Jonge’s conviction for his active 
participation in a gathering held under the 
Communist Party’s auspices, because De Jonge’s 
activities did not promote illegal conduct: 
 
[P]eaceable assembly for lawful discussion 
cannot be made a crime.  The holding of 
meetings for peaceable political action cannot 
be proscribed.  Those who assist in the conduct 
of such meetings cannot be branded as 
criminals on that score.  The question, if the 
rights of free speech and peaceable assembly 
are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices 
under which the meeting is held but as to its 
purpose.   
                                                 
30   See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967) 
(holding that the government could not ban Communist Party 
members from working in defense facilities absent proof that 
they had specific intent to further the Party’s unlawful ends); 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967) (“[m]ere 
knowing membership without a specific intent to further the 
unlawful aims of an organization is not a constitutionally 
adequate basis” for barring employment in state university 
system to Communist Party members); Noto v. United States, 
367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961) (applying same principle to 
criminal statute).  The same principle applies to other 
organizations.  See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 
920. 
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299 U.S. at 365.  See also NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware, 458 U.S. at 908-09 (relying on De Jonge 
to hold that those who participated in the lawful 
aspects of an economic boycott could not be held 
liable for injuries caused by illegal, violent aspects of 
the boycott). 
 
 Here, as in De Jonge, plaintiffs seek to engage in 
lawful peaceable speech and association.  The 
challenged provisions criminalize their speech solely 
because of its association with organizations that 
have been proscribed, like the Communist Party, for 
their illegal activities (coupled with political 
considerations).  De Jonge establishes, however, that 
the government may not proscribe peaceable 
expression and association because of the nature of 
the group with which an individual speaks and 
associates.  
 
 The government attempts to distinguish these 
precedents on the ground that the material-support 
law penalizes the conduct of material support, not 
association itself.  Pet. 19.  But that rationale is 
inapplicable to the provisions as applied here, which 
penalize not conduct, but pure speech.  Plaintiffs seek 
to protect only pure speech, and thus the provisions 
as applied here penalize no conduct at all.  See supra 
pp. 17, 23-24. 
 
 The fact that the challenged provisions 
simultaneously target speech and association makes 
them doubly invalid.  Speech nearly always involves 
some associational element, in that speakers speak 
to listeners, and, particularly when it comes to 
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political expression, often speak in association with 
others.  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 
908 (“‘Effective advocacy of both public and private 
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is 
undeniably enhanced by group association, as this 
Court has more than once recognized by remarking 
upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech 
and assembly.’”) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)). 
 
 Here, the statute selectively criminalizes speech 
on the basis of the association of speaker and 
listeners.  According to the government, the statute 
requires no showing of intent to further a designated 
group’s unlawful activities.  As applied to plaintiffs’ 
intended speech, therefore, the challenged provisions 
violate this Court’s long-established principle that 
association may not be penalized absent proof that 
an individual specifically intended to further an 
organization’s illegal ends.  
 
V.  O’BRIEN IS NOT APPLICABLE AND 
WOULD NOT SAVE THE CHALLENGED 
PROVISIONS AS APPLIED TO 
PLAINTIFFS’ PROPOSED SPEECH 
 
 The government has incorrectly suggested that 
the challenged provisions are sustainable as a 
content-neutral regulation of conduct under United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).  Pet. 19-
20.  The O’Brien intermediate scrutiny standard does 
not apply in this case for three reasons: (1) as 
applied, the challenged provisions regulate not 
conduct, but pure speech; (2) they do so on content-
based grounds; and (3) they directly infringe 
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expressive association.  In any event, the provisions 
as applied here would not satisfy intermediate 
scrutiny, because the government cannot establish 
that penalizing plaintiffs’ pure speech promoting 
peaceable, nonviolent activities is remotely tailored 
to serve any legitimate interest.   
 
 A.  O’Brien Is Inapplicable 
 
 The Court has applied O’Brien’s intermediate 
standard of review to laws that regulate conduct 
directly, but incidentally affect expression connected 
with the regulated conduct.  In O’Brien itself, the 
Court upheld a regulation that prohibited the 
destruction of draft cards as applied to an individual 
who burned his draft card to protest the war.  391 
U.S. at 369. The government had a legitimate, 
speech-neutral reason for preserving draft cards to 
sustain the orderly functioning of the selective 
service.  Id. at 380.  The fact that O’Brien sought to 
violate the law to make a political point did not 
render the prohibition of his conduct invalid, where 
the government’s interest in regulating the conduct 
was unrelated to expression. Id. 
 
 That reasoning is inapplicable here for multiple 
reasons.  First, O’Brien is limited to regulation of 
expressive conduct.  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 
406 (1989) (“[G]overnment generally has a freer 
hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in 
restricting the written or spoken word”) (emphasis 
added).  Thus, the O’Brien standard by its terms 
would not apply to a ban on speech opposing the 
draft.  Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582 
(1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (“The four-part 
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enquiry described in United States v. O’Brien, 
judg[es] the limits of appropriate state action 
burdening expressive acts as distinct from pure 
speech or representation”) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
 
 In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), for 
example, involving a conviction for wearing a jacket 
with an offensive anti-draft expression, the Court 
rejected application of O’Brien or any other lower 
form of scrutiny, because Cohen was penalized not 
for his conduct, but for “communication”: 
 
The conviction quite clearly rests upon the 
asserted offensiveness of the words Cohen used 
to convey his message to the public.  The only 
‘conduct’ which the State sought to punish is 
the fact of communication.  Thus, we deal here 
with a conviction resting solely upon ‘speech,’ 
not upon any separately identifiable conduct .... 
 
Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 
 
 Similarly, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 
U.S. 469 (1975), the Court refused to apply the 
O’Brien standard to Georgia’s rape shield law, 
stating: 
 
 The Georgia cause of action for invasion of 
privacy through public disclosure of the name of 
a rape victim imposes sanctions on pure 
expression—the content of a publication—and 
not conduct or a combination of speech and 
nonspeech elements that might otherwise be 
open to regulation or prohibition.  
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Id. at 495 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77).   
 
 The fact that other aspects of the statute prohibit 
conduct does not make O’Brien applicable to the 
provisions at issue here.  If the regulation in O’Brien 
had banned not only draft card destruction, but also 
speech critical of the draft, a prosecution for an anti-
draft speech would not have triggered O’Brien 
intermediate scrutiny.  In order for O’Brien to apply 
at all in an as-applied challenge, the law in question 
must be applied to conduct, not speech itself. But 
plaintiffs’ proposed activities are pure speech. 
 
 Second, O’Brien is limited to content-neutral 
laws, and the provisions challenged here 
discriminate on the basis of content.  In Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 402-03, for example, the Court 
declined to apply O’Brien to a law banning flag 
desecration because it concluded that the law 
discriminated on the basis of content.  Where, as 
here, a statute on its face targets expression based 
on its content, the government’s interest cannot be 
said to be “unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression,” a critical threshold requirement for 
O’Brien scrutiny.  O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.  
 
 Third, O’Brien does not apply where, as here, a 
law directly regulates expressive association.  In Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000), 
the Court held O’Brien inapplicable where a state’s 
general ban on discrimination in public 
accommodations was applied to the Boy Scouts in a 
way that “directly and immediately affects 
associational rights” (by restricting its ability to 
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choose who would serve as a scoutmaster).  As the 
Court explained: 
 
A law prohibiting the destruction of draft cards 
only incidentally affects the free speech rights 
of those who happen to use a violation of that 
law as a symbol of protest.  But New Jersey's 
public accommodations law directly and 
immediately affects associational rights, in this 
case associational rights that enjoy First 
Amendment protection.  Thus, O’Brien is 
inapplicable. 
 
Id. at 659. The Court similarly rejected the 
invocation of O’Brien to defend patronage practices 
because they directly regulated pure association.  
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).  As the Court 
explained, “O’Brien dealt with the constitutionality 
of laws regulating the ‘nonspeech’ elements of 
expressive conduct.  No such regulation is involved 
here, for it is association and belief per se, not any 
particular form of conduct, [that is at issue].”  Id. at 
363 n.17.  
 
 As in Elrod and Dale, so here, the application of 
the law directly infringes plaintiffs’ rights of 
expressive association.  It “directly and immediately” 
precludes them from engaging in speech in 
association with the PKK or the LTTE.  O’Brien 
therefore does not apply. 
 
 The government argued below that the material-
support law is analogous to laws this Court has 
upheld restricting trade and travel with particular 
foreign nations.  See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 
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222 (1984).  But the trade and travel regulations are 
critically different.  They regulate conduct (travel 
and financial transactions), not pure speech.  So 
while an individual who engages in the conduct of 
proscribed trade or travel for expressive purposes 
would find his challenge analyzed under O’Brien, the 
provisions as applied here criminalize pure speech 
and association.  In Regan v. Wald itself, the Court 
pointedly distinguished the permissible “general ban 
on travel to Cuba” from impermissible efforts to 
“selectively … deny passports on the basis of political 
affiliation” with the Communist Party, struck down 
in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), 
and Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).  See Regan, 
468 U.S. at 241.  Thus, intermediate scrutiny is not 
applicable here.    
 
 B. The Challenged Provisions Could Not 
Survive Even Intermediate Scrutiny 
 
 Were the Court to apply intermediate scrutiny, 
the challenged provisions would still fail.  O’Brien 
holds that a regulation of conduct that incidentally 
affects speech will be sustained:  
 
if it is within the constitutional power of the 
Government; if it furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest.  
 
391 U.S. at 377.  
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 The provisions as applied here fail intermediate 
scrutiny because – even aside from their being 
anything but unrelated to the suppression of 
expression31 – they “burden … more speech than is 
necessary to further the government’s legitimate 
interests.”  Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.  While 
intermediate scrutiny does not demand that the 
government use the least restrictive means to 
further its ends, it still must “demonstrate that the 
recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and 
that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms 
in a direct and material way.”  Turner Broadcasting, 
512 U.S. at 664.  Without evidence that speech 
advocating wholly lawful, nonviolent ends furthers 
terrorism, the government has not met its burden of 
showing the requisite fit between these provisions 
and its legitimate national security interests, even 
under the more lenient O’Brien standard. 
 
VI. THE COURT CAN AVOID THESE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS BY 
INTERPRETING THE STATUTE TO 
PROHIBIT ONLY SPEECH INTENDED 
TO FURTHER UNLAWFUL ENDS 
 
 In the courts below, plaintiffs argued that the 
statute should be interpreted to prohibit only speech 
intended to further a group’s illegal ends.  The lower 
courts declined to adopt such an interpretation with 
respect to the statute as a whole.  But adopting such 
                                                 
31 
  The Court in more recent cases has treated the criterion 
that a measure be “unrelated to the suppression of expression” 
as a threshold requirement for application of O’Brien at all, and 
accordingly plaintiffs addressed it above.  See supra, Point V.A.  
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an interpretation with respect to the provisions 
challenged here would be consistent with Congress’s 
directive that the statute not be “construed or 
applied” in a way that would violate First 
Amendment rights.  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i).  Such an 
interpretation would also fully support the relief 
plaintiffs seek, while avoiding substantial 
constitutional questions.  Jones v. United States, 526 
U.S. 227, 239 (1999) (“[W]here a statute is 
susceptible of two constructions, by one of which 
grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and 
by the other of which such questions are avoided, our 
duty is to adopt the latter.”) (internal citations 
omitted).32   
 
 A.  The Statute Should Be Interpreted to 
Require Proof of Intent to Further a 
Designated Organization’s Illegal Ends  
 
 The Court can avoid the constitutional problems 
identified above if it interprets the challenged 
provisions to require proof of intent to further the 
designated organization’s illegal activities when 
applied to pure speech and association.  This Court 
adopted precisely that interpretation of the Smith 
Act in Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).  
The relevant language of the material-support 
statute is, if anything, even more susceptible to such 
an interpretation than the Smith Act.   
                                                 
32  The construction plaintiffs propose, requiring proof of 
intent to further a group’s terrorist activities, would not 
necessarily save the statute’s constitutionality in every context, 
but because it would fully protect plaintiffs here, it would 
permit the Court to avoid resolution of a constitutional 
question.   
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 The Smith Act criminalized “membership” in 
organizations that advocated violent overthrow, 
“knowing the purpose thereof.”  18 U.S.C. § 2385. 
The statute did not by its terms require intent to 
further the group’s illegal aims.  Yet to avoid due 
process and First Amendment concerns, the Court 
interpreted the statute to require, not merely the 
knowledge of the group’s purposes specified on the 
face of the statute, but also “‘specific[] inten[t] to 
accomplish [the aims of the organization] by resort to 
violence.’” Scales, 367 U.S. at 229 (quoting Noto v. 
United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961)).  
 
  On its face, the material-support statute also 
criminalizes “knowing” provision of training, expert 
advice, service, and personnel, and raises similar 
constitutional concerns.  Here, as in Scales, the 
Court can avoid those constitutional questions by 
interpreting the statute to require proof of intent to 
further a designated organization’s illegal ends.    
 
 The court of appeals declined to adopt this 
interpretation.  It reasoned that the statute in Scales 
was “silent as to mens rea,” whereas 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B includes a requirement that defendants 
“know” that the organization they are supporting is 
designated “terrorist” or has engaged in violent 
activities.  The court concluded that it would be 
inconsistent with Congress’s requirement of 
“knowledge” of the group’s terrorist character to also 
require “intent” to further the group’s illegal 
activities.  Pet. App. 16a.    
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 Contrary to the court of appeals’ reasoning, 
however, the Smith Act interpreted in Scales was not 
silent on mens rea.  Like 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, it 
required “knowing” support.  This Court nonetheless 
concluded that to preserve the statute’s 
constitutionality, it should be interpreted to require 
specific intent to further the Party’s illegal ends.  A 
heightened intent requirement, to avoid 
constitutional difficulties, is thus consistent with an 
express “knowing” requirement.   
 
 With respect to § 2339B, there is both statutory 
language and legislative history to support this 
narrowing construction – neither of which existed in 
the Smith Act.  Congress expressly invited such an 
interpretation when, aware that courts had 
identified constitutional flaws in the statute, it 
provided in 2004 that the statute should not be 
“construed or applied” in a manner that would 
violate the First Amendment.  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i).   
 
 When Congress first enacted the statute, 
moreover, it stated that it sought to prohibit material 
support “to the fullest possible basis, consistent with 
the Constitution.”  AEDPA, § 301(b), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B note.  The bill’s sponsor, Senator Orrin 
Hatch, stated in introducing the Conference Report 
that: 
  
[t]his bill also includes provisions making it a 
crime to knowingly provide material support to 
the terrorist functions of terrorist groups 
designated by a Presidential finding to be 
engaged in terrorist activities. ...  I am satisfied 
that we have crafted a narrow but effective 
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designation provision which meets these 
obligations while safeguarding the freedom to 
associate.33   
 
 To interpret the challenged provisions here to 
include a specific intent requirement when speech 
and association are at issue would accord with the 
Court’s treatment of the Smith Act in Scales, honor 
Congress’s express directive that the statute not be 
“construed or applied” so as to violate the First 
Amendment, and ensure that the law did precisely 
what the bill’s sponsor said it would: criminalize 
support “to the terrorist functions of terrorist groups 
... while safeguarding the freedom to associate.”  
 
 B. The Government’s Proposed Statutory 
Construction Would Not Avoid the 
Constitutional Questions 
 
The government proffers an alternative 
construction, which would interpret the statute 
simply to exempt “independent advocacy.”  Pet. 21.  
This construction, however, would not avoid the 
constitutional problems with the statute or resolve 
the dispute over plaintiffs’ proposed speech.  Pure 
political speech of the type in which plaintiffs seek to 
engage is protected not merely when it is done 
“independently,” but also when it is done in 
conjunction with others.34  Activities such as writing, 
                                                 
33  142 Cong. Rec. S3354 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement 
of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added) (quoted in HLP II, 352 F.3d at 
402).   
 
34  See Dale, 530 U.S. at 647 (“‘[I]mplicit in the right to engage 
in activities protected by the First Amendment’ is ‘a 
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speaking, and teaching do not lose their First 
Amendment protection when done in coordination 
with others.  Bob Woodward, for example, does not 
forfeit his First Amendment rights because he writes 
under the direction of his Washington Post editors.  
Nor did Communist Party members lose their First 
Amendment protections because they protested and 
demonstrated at the direction of a foreign-dominated 
organization.  See supra, note 30 (citing cases). 
 
 To protect political speech only when it is 
undertaken “independently” would strike at the core 
of political speech, which almost necessarily involves 
associational expression.  The government’s notion of 
“independent advocacy” would not seem to exempt 
speaking to, or in collaboration with, members of the 
organization, as plaintiffs propose to do here.  Thus, 
the proffered interpretation would not permit the 
Court to avoid plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge.   
 
 Moreover, the government’s proposed 
construction would introduce even further confusion 
to an already vague statute.  Citizens would have to 
guess at whether their activities were “independent,” 
or involved “some collaboration or other relationship 
between the giver and the recipient.”  Pet. 22.  Would 
checking facts with a PKK official on a human rights 
complaint constitute a “collaboration or other 
relationship” warranting criminal sanctions?  
Virtually any effort to communicate with a 
designated group regarding one’s advocacy could be 
                                                                                                    
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide 
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and 
cultural ends.’”) (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 
U.S. 609, 622 (1984)). 
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viewed as forfeiting independence and entering a 
“collaboration or other relationship.”  The 
government’s proposed “construction” would not cure 
the provisions’ many infirmities, but would only 
further muddy the waters.35 
 
 In short, the Court can avoid the constitutional 
issues presented here only by adopting plaintiffs’ 
proposed construction, much as it did in Scales.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 For all of the above reasons, the Court should 
affirm the court of appeals’ decision with respect to 
the provisions it held invalid as applied to plaintiffs’ 
speech, and reverse the court’s decision with respect 
to the provisions it upheld.    
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35  The government’s construction also is in considerable 
tension with the statutory language as the government itself 
reads it.  The government would create an exemption from the 
entire statute for “independent advocacy,” despite the fact that 
Congress did not do so, but only created a more limited 
exemption, from the “personnel” prohibition alone, for “entirely 
independent” activity.  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h).  And it would 
exempt advocacy that, even if independent, would seemingly be 
“for the benefit of” a designated group, the standard the 
government has advanced to interpret the “service” ban.   
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APPENDIX 
 
1. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) and (iv) provide as 
follows: 
 
(iii) “Terrorist activity” defined. As used in this Act, 
the term “terrorist activity” means any activity 
which is unlawful under the laws of the place where 
it is committed (or which, if it had been committed in 
the United States, would be unlawful under the laws 
of the United States or any State) and which involves 
any of the following: 
(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any convey-
ance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle). 
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to 
kill, injure, or continue to detain, another indiv-
idual in order to compel a third person (including 
a governmental organization) to do or abstain 
from doing any act as an explicit or implicit 
condition for the release of the individual seized 
or detained. 
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally 
protected person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) 
of title 18, United States Code) or upon the 
liberty of such a person. 
(IV) An assassination. 
(V) The use of any— 
(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or 
nuclear weapon or device, or 
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or 
dangerous device (other than for mere 
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personal monetary gain), with intent to 
endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of 
one or more individuals or to cause 
substantial damage to property. 
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of 
the foregoing. 
(iv) “Engage in terrorist activity” defined. As used in 
this Act, the term “engage in terrorist activity” 
means, in an individual capacity or as a member of 
an organization— 
(I) to commit or to incite to commit, under 
circumstances indicating an intention to cause 
death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity; 
(II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity; 
(III) to gather information on potential targets 
for terrorist activity; 
(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for— 
(aa) a terrorist activity; 
(bb) a terrorist organization described in 
clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or 
(cc) a terrorist organization described in 
clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can 
demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that he did not know, and should 
not reasonably have known, that the 
organization was a terrorist organization; 
(V) to solicit any individual— 
(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described 
in this subsection; 
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(bb) for membership in a terrorist organiza-
tion described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or 
(cc) for membership in a terrorist organiza-
tion described in clause (vi)(III) unless the 
solicitor can demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that he did not know, 
and should not reasonably have known, that 
the organization was a terrorist organization; 
or 
(VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or 
reasonably should know, affords material 
support, including a safe house, transportation, 
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other 
material financial benefit, false documentation or 
identification, weapons (including chemical, 
biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or 
training— 
(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity; 
(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, 
or reasonably should know, has committed or 
plans to commit a terrorist activity; 
(cc) to a terrorist organization described in 
subclause (I) or (II) of clause (vi) or to any 
member of such an organization; or 
(dd) to a terrorist organization described in 
clause (vi)(III), or to any member of such an 
organization, unless the actor can 
demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that the actor did not know, and 
should not reasonably have known, that the 
organization was a terrorist organization. 
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2. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1189(a) and (d)(2) provide in relevant 
part as follows: 
 
Designation of foreign terrorist organizations  
 
(a) Designation. 
(1) In general. The Secretary is authorized to 
designate an organization as a foreign terrorist 
organization in accordance with this subsection if 
the Secretary finds that— 
(A) the organization is a foreign organization; 
(B) the organization engages in terrorist 
activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) [8 
USCS § 1182(a)(3)(B)][)] or terrorism (as 
defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 
1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)(2)), or 
retains the capability and intent to engage in 
terrorist activity or terrorism[)]; and 
(C) the terrorist activity or terrorism of the 
organization threatens the security of United 
States nationals or the national security of 
the United States. 
*   *   *   *   * 
(d) Definitions. As used in this section— 
*   *   *   *   * 
(2) the term “national security” means the 
national defense, foreign relations, or economic 
interests of the United States; 
 
